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ABSTRACT This article explores what cultural studies can learn from the detailed 
consideration of the individual voice in Bourdieu’s The Weight of the World  (1999). 
This book addresses the criticism often made of Bourdieu’s earlier work – that it 
ignored individual agency in favour of structure – through a depiction of French 
society’s ‘space of points of view’. Based on in-depth interviews, it offers an 
intriguing methodology, while leaving unresolved methodological uncertainties and 
theoretical absences, including a neglect of the role of media and popular culture in 
everyday experience. To build on Bourdieu’s work, the conclusion suggests we 
explore how a range of social categories derived from media and popular culture are 
employed in everyday action and thought.  
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THE INDIVIDUAL ‘POINT OF VIEW’: 
LEARNING FROM BOURDIEU’S THE WEIGHT OF THE WORLD 
Introduction 
The individual’s relationship to the wider space of ‘society’ and ‘culture’ remains 
problematic. While at an abstract level the individual/ social dichotomy is an old issue 
in social science of limited contemporary interest (methodological individualism 
being generally unacceptable outside the narrow confines of rational choice theory), at 
the level of explaining specific actions it remains important. It was Robert Merton 
who highlighted the tension between socially and culturally transmitted aspirations 
and the actual opportunities that a society holds out for its members (Merton, 1938): 
such tensions may be even more acute when the disarticulation between official 
‘values’ (the culture espoused by society’s apparent ‘centres’) and many individuals’ 
perspectives on values and justice is as great as it is now in the war-states of USA and 
Britain. Such tensions between the individual and the general point of view have been 
important, if not always resolved, in cultural studies, as Carolyn Steedman (1986) 
among others has shown.1 That is a good enough reason to pay close attention to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s attempt in his late work to connect the ‘space of [individual] points 
of view’ to his wider sociology; for, even if Bourdieu’s own view of cultural studies 
seemed unhelpfully dismissive (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999), there are significant 
parallels between his work and cultural studies’ concern with the individual voice, 
parallels based in the emphasis that Bourdieu, unlike other major sociologists of the 
late 20th century, gave to the symbolic dimensions of power and inequality.  
 
I want to explore these questions by looking in detail at what cultural studies can learn 
from one of Bourdieu’s major texts of the 1990s, The Weight of the World (Bourdieu, 
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1999). Why is The Weight of the World of particular significance? Bourdieu was, 
especially in his last years, a controversial figure, intellectually and politically, in 
France and elsewhere, and La Misère de Monde, originally published in 1993 and 
translated into English in 1999, was one of his most controversial books. It is in this 
book that Bourdieu faced head-on the question of exactly what weight can be given to 
individual voices in the analysis of the social world, implicitly addressing earlier 
criticism of his work for neglecting such voices. Notwithstanding some important 
methodological limitations,  Bourdieu in this book goes further than other major 
social theorists in exploring the complexities of the individual point of view. 
 
There are other, broader, justifications for devoting a whole article to this single book. 
The Weight of the World challenges some ‘postmodern’ readings of the social world, 
which take a positive view of the fracturing of shared frameworks for interpreting 
social reality. Against this, Bourdieu and his collaborators prioritised themes, which 
while hardly ignored in contemporary sociology, have rarely been collected together 
with such force: the experience of poor housing and unemployment, social and 
symbolic forms of exclusion (as one of Bourdieu’s interlocutors puts it, ‘a poverty 
that is hidden’),2 conflicts between generations whether in a work or family context, 
inter-ethnic conflict, the confrontation between the powerful and the vulnerable in the 
state systems of education or law enforcement, the everyday anxieties of the gendered 
workplace, the loneliness of the elderly and sick. This concentration on social 
suffering was, of course, one reason for the book’s controversial status in France, and 
it raises methodological issues of its own (discussed below), but as an inflection of 




Bourdieu’s book, however, does much more than prioritise suffering for its own sake; 
if it did not, it would hardly merit wider theoretical interest. The particular way in 
which Bourdieu defines social suffering emphasises two symbolic dimensions of 
conflict which are often neglected: first, the irreconcileable conflict between 
individual points of view, that Bourdieu takes from Weber but updates for a world of 
global economic disruption and population movement; and, second, the specific 
conflict between those who have the authority to enforce their representations of the 
social world and those who lack that power. Bourdieu’s position is political, in two 
distinct ways: he is arguing both that our conception of politics needs to expand to 
include ‘all the diffuse expectations and hopes which, because they often touch on the 
ideas that people have about their own identity and self-respect . . . [are usually] 
excluded from political debate’ (1999: 627) and that the wider symbolic and material 
landscapes within which individuals have no choice but to make sense of their lives 
are always, themselves, political constructions (1999: 127), whose uneven effects 
must be examined. It is reasonable therefore to read The Weight of the World  both as 
an example of committed sociological scholarship3 and as a contribution, indirectly, 
to (not quite yet dead) policy debates about social exclusion and the digital divide.  
 
It is true that Bourdieu’s work at all times remains within a social science framework: 
it never comes close to the autobiographical or to recent auto-ethnographic 
experiments (on which see, Denzin, 2003). Bourdieu’s arguments, however, are 
developed, undeniably, from a critical perspective which seeks to use the sociological 
imagination to challenge neoliberal ‘common sense’ (Bourdieu, 1998b). This is not 
therefore, I suggest, the time to widen disciplinary differences, but rather the time to 
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explore what cultural studies can learn from Bourdieu’s own most searching 
explorations of what the individual voice can contribute to sociological 
understanding. 
 
The ‘Proper Place’ of the Individual in Bourdieu  
Bourdieu had a particularly complex notion of social space (cf Brubaker, 1985: 764); 
unlike Marx, he saw social space in modern societies not as focussed around one 
organising principle (relations to the means of economic production), but as a space 
with multiple (if interrelated) fields of competition, where different forms of capital 
are at stake. In addition, although some critics have suggested otherwise, Bourdieu 
always acknowledged the complexity of the individual position, at least to the extent 
that for him individual actions can only be understood by grasping individuals’ 
different structural positions in, and historical trajectories across, social space.  
 
For Bourdieu, individual action is the principal site where social structure can be 
reproduced, since he rejects any abstract notion of social ‘structure’ as a determining 
force in itself; by this, however, he means individual action in a very particular sense, 
namely the locally improvised actions of individuals that are based upon the 
‘dispositions’ those individuals have acquired, and whose acquisition is itself 
structurally determined by the objective conditions in which that individual has lived 
his or her life (the individual’s position in social space, including both inherited 
capital and actual resources, economic, cultural and symbolic). A person’s available 
set of dispositions (or ‘habitus’) closes off her possibilities for action, by constraining 
the resources she has to act in the situations she encounters. In the simplest case 
which Bourdieu imagines, a traditional ‘closed’ society, because individuals’ 
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dispositions are structurally determined by the very same unchanging forces that 
determine the situations they encounter, there is a ‘natural’ fit between people’s 
actions and the contexts in which they act. While it is wrong (as Jeffrey Alexander 
(1995) does) to dismiss Bourdieu’s model as simply deterministic since that ignores 
the importance he attributes to the improvised details of action, there is certainly a 
tendency in Bourdieu to look for such a natural fit and to see situations where it does 
not obtain as the exceptions that have to be explained, rather than, perhaps, the norm 
that might provoke us into developing an alternative theory (cf Martuccelli, 1999: 
137).  
 
Implied in Bourdieu’s model, as should be clear even from the extremely brief 
account just given, is a notion of place. Bourdieu’s basic model of social action 
implies an identifiable, relatively closed place where the fit (or potential fit) between 
dispositions and situations is worked out. As a leading French critic of Pierre 
Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau, put it, this whole concept of practice depends on an 
‘economy of the proper place’ (1984: 55). That ‘proper place’ is either the specific 
field where an individual seeks to maximise her capital to succeed in that field or the 
situated body by and through which a particular habitus is acquired and sustained.  
 
Where exactly – in what space - does the habitus get formed? Although Bourdieu’s 
account of these issues is complex and multidimensional, it is reasonable to see a 
gradual shift of emphasis in his work. For traditional societies, as just noted, his 
answer seems relatively straightforward; social space is not yet broken down into 
competing fields of action, and so ‘habitus’ emerges without reference to the notion of 
a field (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990a), and its acquisition is tied very closely to the 
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uninterrupted spatial context of everyday life, in the home and the village. But in 
complex societies, much, if not most, social action is impossible to grasp except by 
reference to the specialised field where, according to Bourdieu, it takes place. This 
creates an uncertainty, as Danilo Martuccelli has noted, as to which is given causal 
priority: the particular fields where individuals act, or the spaces (no longer limited to 
the home but including, for example, the school) where individuals’ early lives are 
shaped (Martucelli, 1999: 129-32)? To be fair, Bourdieu never gives a simple answer 
to this question. From early on, he recognised the interpenetration of family 
background and schooling (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979); other later work (The State 
Nobility (1996)) notes the increasing centralisation of the state’s power over the 
categorisation of social existence that operates through France’s network of elite 
schools and colleges.4 Constant, however, throughout Bourdieu’s work is an 
assumption that there still are relatively closed spaces where the determining 
principles of an individual’s practice are internalised. As he says at the opening of The 
Weight of the World the study ‘is based in the very reality of the social world . . . it is 
within each of these permanent groups (neighbours and co-workers) which set the 
lived boundaries of all their experiences, that the oppositions . . . separating classes, 
ethnic groups or generations, are perceived and experienced’ (1999: 4, added 
emphasis). Yet in today’s mediated world, even the private space of the home has its 
open ‘window onto the world’ (television and increasingly the Internet). This point is 
of more than passing interest. It represents a major gap in Bourdieu’s vast oeuvre not 
to have analysed the implications of this media-generated spatial ambiguity for the 
‘proper place’ (if any) of social reproduction. I revisit this point in relation to The 
Weight of the World’s inattention to media and popular culture, but already it should 
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be clear that Bourdieu’s neglect of media culture has significant methodological 
implications for our assessment of his work on the individual voice. 
 
At the same time, in foregrounding, through the spatially-inflected concept of habitus, 
the issue of where the individual’s dispositions are formed, Bourdieu’s approach has 
advantages over some other sociological frameworks, whether Giddens’ structuration 
theory (1984) or Luhmann’s systems approach (1999), neither of which address the 
tensions between structure and agency so directly at the level of the individual (how 
agency becomes possible, how it is reflexively experienced). An exception admittedly 
would be the work of Alain Touraine and those, such as Francois Dubet, who have 
worked with Touraine at Paris’ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. They 
have posed and answered the individual/ social question in a direct and radical way. 
Both Touraine (1988, 2000) and Dubet (1994, 1995) highlight the identity crisis of the 
‘de-socialised’ individual in a world where ‘society . . . is incapable of producing and 
reproducing itself’ (Touraine, 2000: 72), leaving sociology’s main subject as the 
individual’s struggle to ‘master and construct their experience’ (Dubet, 1995: 118). 
Broadening De Certeau’s interest in the consequences of secularisation (Maigret, 
2000), Touraine argues for the problematisation of any central principle of social 
order (Touraine, 1988: xxiv, 118), and the focus on individuals’ struggle to produce 
new, possibly shared, values and culture (Touraine, 1988: 8, 12). In Dubet’s work in 
particular, the outcome of this ‘de-socialisation’ is left ambiguous. There is, Dubet 
argues, no necessary hierarchy between a number of competing dimensions of 
individual experience: first, our sense of social integration, second, the pattern of our 
rational strategies to acquire capital, and third, our attempt to develop an individual 
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life-project (Dubet, 1995: 113-114). The question of the social is not abolished, but 
problematised, as a space whose tensions are focussed in individual action:  
. . . the social subject is neither the individual in the outside world who only 
realizes his individuality in ascetism, nor the social actor fully defined by his roles. 
He is the tension between these two elements. (Dubet, 1994: 22-23) 
As we review the strengths and weaknesses of Bourdieu’s account it is worth asking, 
therefore, what hold he maintains on such ambiguities, bearing in mind that the 
tensions around the individual’s position in social and cultural space is theoretically 
important for cultural studies also, because of its concern with the exclusions and 
power relations within culture (cf Couldry, 2000, chapter 3).  
 
The Space of Points of View 
In The Weight of the World (1999), the tension between Bourdieu’s particular theory 
of the social world and the irreducible complexity of individual perspectives on that 
world emerges with particular clarity. Views of this book differ widely and some have 
seen in it the closest Bourdieu’s sociological model comes to collapsing under its own 
weight (Martuccelli, 1999: 136-141). I take a more positive view and want to 
emphasise the book’s continuities with the concerns of some Anglo-US cultural 
sociology, as well as with the rest of Bourdieu’s work. I also bring out some 
methodological difficulties and limitations (particularly its occlusion of the everyday 
media and cultural landscape).  
 
Individual voices were not unheard in Bourdieu’s earlier work: such voices are 
present in numerous quotations in Distinction (1984) and in full interview transcripts 
elsewhere (for example, Bourdieu et al., 1963). The issue however is always: how 
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much weight individual voices are given in Bourdieu’s overall analysis of the social 
world? For some commentators, the odds are set too heavily against the individual 
voice; indeed one unsympathetic critic argued that Bourdieu, by privileging social 
reproduction, was blind to individuals’ values and ideals (Alexander, 1995: 137). That 
criticism takes little account of Bourdieu’s long-term concern with attacking the 
fallacy that substitutes the theorist’s generalisations for the individual’s embodied 
practice (1977, 1990a, 2000). More subtle critics like Craig Calhoun argue that 
Bourdieu gives excessive emphasis to the individual’s general strategies of capital 
acquisition, compared with other forms of individual agency (for example, individual 
practices of creativity); on the other hand, Calhoun argues, Bourdieu tells us too little 
about the new structural pressures that expanding information technology and 
electronic communications pose for individuals (1995: 141-142, 155). In a sense, The 
Weight of the World tries to respond to both crude and subtle lines of critique. Here 
we do hear many individual voices articulating their values and ideals, and space is 
given to their adaptations to their position (whether successful or not) and to their 
view of the world; and we do hear their reflections, if not on the information and 
communications environment, at least on the new ‘flexible’ world of work that others 
(McRobbie, 1998; Sennett, 1999) have analysed in detail.  
 
It would be a mistake, however, to see The Weight of the World as a retreat from the 
ambitions of Bourdieu’s earlier structural theory. Bourdieu’s sociology has always 
emphasised how individuals are each differently constrained by the uneven 
distribution of symbolic power. As he puts it in one of his last books, the Pascalian 
Meditations: ‘one of the most unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, 
the most cruel, is the distribution of symbolic capital, that is, of social importance and 
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reasons for living’ (2000: 241). Indeed it may be the central task of critical sociology 
to confront this:  
the social sciences which alone can unmask and counter the completely new 
strategies of domination which they sometimes help to inspire and to arm, will 
more than ever have to choose which side they are on: either they place their 
rational instruments of knowledge at the service of ever more rationalised 
domination, or they rationally analyse domination and more especially the 
contribution which rational knowledge can make to de facto monopolisation of the 
profits of universal reason. (Bourdieu, 2000: 83-84). 
Or, as he puts it more succinctly elsewhere (1998a: 21), ‘we must work towards 
universalising the conditions of access to the universal’.  
 
This point is essential to understanding the strategy of The Weight of the World. As 
many of its interviews bring out, individuals must live with the consequences of the 
power that others’ point of view has over them. So, for example, we hear of the 
‘destiny effect’ or ‘reality principle’ (1999: 63, 5-7) imposed by schools’ symbolic 
power over students and their families. Differentials in symbolic resources are linked 
to other inequalities, of course: differences in economic and cultural capital, but also, 
less obviously, spatial differentiations which solidify social boundaries through 
unevenly distributing assets within, and connections across, space (1999: 126-27). 
Social space involves the patterning of social and symbolic resources which ensures 
that speaking from ‘here’ is not the same as speaking from ‘there’. Turning again to 
the formulation of the Pascalian Meditations, there is no simple level playing field on 
which social action takes place:  
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when powers are unequally distributed, the economic and social world presents 
itself not as a universe of possibles equally accessible to every possible subject – 
posts to be occupied, courses to be taken, markets to be won, goods to be 
consumed, properties to be exchanged – but rather as a signposted universe, full of 
injunctions and prohibitions, signs of appropriation and exclusion, obligatory 
routes or impassable barriers, and in a word, profoundly differentiated. (Bourdieu, 
2000: 225, cf 134, 183) 
It is this insight above all (the insistence on the symbolic dimensions of contemporary 
social conflict) that makes Bourdieu’s work important for cultural studies; and it is 
this insight that underlies Bourdieu’s insistence at the beginning of The Weight of the 
World on understanding the multidimensional ‘space of points of view’ (1999: 3), in 
which social actors act and think.   
 
The space of points of view is not the infinite privatised plurality of individual 
viewpoints that ‘postmodern’ accounts of society’s dissolution, whether broadly 
optimistic or pessimistic, suggest.5 It is a highly organised space where the mutual 
incomprehensibility of individual viewpoints stems from underlying differences in 
structural position, dictated by inequality in economic, social and symbolic resources. 
Such conflicts stem, in part, from agents’ awareness of how their share of resources 
measures up against others’ (the ‘ordinary suffering’ or la petite misère (1999: 4) that 
comes from ‘relative deprivation’ (Runciman, 1972)), but Bourdieu inflects a 
Weberian insistence on the incompatibility of perspectives with an emphasis (drawn 
as much from Durkheim) on conflict over representations of the world, and over the 
resources to make those representations. Such inequality has a symbolic dimension 
which cannot be mapped in terms of economic measures of poverty, but is no less 
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central to grasping how social space is ordered. Specific examples in The Weight of 
the World include the different worldviews of temporary and permanent workers in 
the same car factory (1999: 257-296, 317-339) where work-based solidarity has been 
undermined by new forms of work organisation (1999: 275, cf Sennett, 1999), and the 
tensions between inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods and the media who come to 
‘represent’ them (1999: 99-105). Such forms of suffering (based in an inequality in 
‘rights over the future’: 2000: 225) are precisely hidden from the sociologist’s abstract 
‘quasi-divine point of view’ (1999: 3). They only emerge at the level of the 
individual: conflicts between individuals’ ideal of work and the ‘institutional bad 
faith’ of particular working settings (1999: 190, 205, 249; cf 229, 241); conflicts 
between generations over how to value the family’s assets (1999: 381-391), and so 
on. If a common theme through the book is individual loss, what is lost, again and 
again, is very often the possibility of a perspective shared with others, whether at 
work, or in politics, or in inter-ethnic relations. 
 
I return later to some important limitations of Bourdieu’s analysis. But in its emphasis 
on the complexities of the space of points of view, it connects with a neglected strain 
in recent cultural sociology and cultural studies. In classical sociology, C. Wright 
Mills insisted that ‘no social study that does not come back to the problems of 
biography, and of their intersections within society, has completed its intellectual 
journey’ (1970[1959]: 12); indeed the structural importance of conflicts between 
society’s values and individuals’ capacities and resources goes back to Robert 
Merton’s article ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ (1938).6  Even so, work based on that 
principle in sociology (such as Sennett and Cobb (1972), Gilligan (1982), Skeggs 
(1997)) and in media and cultural studies (Nightingale (1993), Steedman (1986), 
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Press (1991), Walkerdine (1997)) has been rare. Yet at stake in this neglected 
tradition is a broader question of the social impacts of the unequal distribution of 
symbolic, especially narrative, resources to which The Weight of the World, whatever 
its weaknesses, is an important contribution.  
 
The Weight of the World: Specific Methodological Issues 
What is striking about The Weight of the World is the emphasis Bourdieu puts on the 
evidential value of individual narratives:  
Situated at points where social structures “work”, and therefore worked over by the 
contradictions of these structures, these individuals are constrained, in order to live 
or to survive, to practice a kind of self-analysis, which often gives them access to 
the objective contradictions which have them in their grasp, and to the objective 
structures expressed in and by these contradictions. (Bourdieu, 1999: 511) 
Here the ‘proper place’ of analysis is not only the site where habitus is formed, but the 
site where individual narratives of conflict and dissent are articulated and developed 
over time. At the same time, Bourdieu sharply distinguishes proper sociological 
treatment of individual narratives from journalistic or popular accounts, whether 
individuals’ own de-contextualised accounts of themselves (see below) or ungrounded 
media commentary on social affairs (1999: 628). Both are doxic representations of the 
social from which the sociologist must distance himself. Implicitly, therefore, 
Bourdieu raises the methodological stakes at play in using individual accounts of the 
social world as evidence. 
 
Specifically Bourdieu insists early in the book on not narrativising the interviews in a 
literary way (1999: 3, 63; cf Grass and Bourdieu, 2000: 26), since ‘writing well’ 
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might obscure the constructed nature of the interview situation. Bourdieu’s caution is 
in line with many sociologists and social psychologists (Potter and Wetherall, 1987; 
Skeggs, 1997). The practice is, however, not always so straightforward. First of all, 
perhaps inevitably in such a large multi-authored book, there are lapses, where quasi-
literary interpretation takes over from scientific caution. Sometimes this is harmless, 
as in this comment which legitimates the role of the sociologist-interviewer: ‘all she 
has left is the satisfaction, not without bitterness it is true, of having understood after 
the event what it was that happened to her, a satisfaction that can help to transform an 
apparently intolerable destiny into a new, unexpected freedom’ (Jean-Pierre Faguer, 
in 1999: 552). At other times, the distortion goes further. So in Michel Pialoux’s 
interpretation of interviews with car workers, we hear of one interviewee (on page 
270) that his relationship to the future is constructed through his children’s propsects - 
“they’re doing pretty well”, he says with a smile, but he doesn’t venture far into 
territory he doesn’t know well, afraid that the future has unpleasant surprises in store 
for him’ - but (by page 271) his relative silence is interpreted as part of a wider 
‘disillusionment’ ‘that is tied to the present but also comes out of a whole history: 
disillusionment that shows in the way he looks at his own past, at his own future or 
that is his children’. Where do we draw the line between literary overinterpretation 
and sociological caution?  
 
Bourdieu’s own view is clear when he explains the point of the book’s interviews:  
[which is] attempting to situate oneself in the place the interviewees occupy in the 
social space in order to understand them as necessarily what they are . . . to give 
oneself a generic and genetic comprehension of who these individuals are, based 
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on a theoretical and practical grasp of the social conditions of which they are the 
product. (1999: 613, added emphasis) 
Yet this is itself quite a particular and contentious view of how individuals ‘fit’ into 
social space, which prioritises the ‘conditions associated with the entire category to 
which any individual belongs’ (ibid.). Whether there are such positions, conditions 
and categories is clearly a sociological question, and ruling such a question out in 
advance under cover of a methodological strategy is itself close to a literary conceit.  
 
It would be quite wrong, however, to suggest that Bourdieu’s approach to the 
interview material is anything less than cautious and self-reflexive.7 First, he is well 
aware of the degree of self-censorship interviewees probably exercised in the 
interview situation, particularly around the display of racism (1999: 616, and compare 
interview on page 33). Second, he is sensitive to the symbolic power  differential 
inherent to the interview situation, and therefore insists on reducing the consequent 
symbolic violence (in Bourdieu’s term) through, for example, various interviewer 
comments designed to underplay the formal distance between interviewer and 
interviewee. Bourdieu calls this practice, slightly oddly, ‘methodical listening’ (1999: 
609, emphasis added), even though in his own interview with two young men on a 
housing estate (Francois and Ali) he does far more than ‘listen’, making various 
interventions and suggested interpretations which, from another perspective, would be 
seen as leading questions. He comments (without prompting from the men) ‘and there 
are lots of problems like this? It’s always the same people who get accused?’ (1999: 
65). While this diverges from standard interviewing technique, the aim is to avoid 
what Bourdieu sees as the misleading ‘neutrality’ of a structured questionnaire or 
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survey which reinforces, rather than softens, the power differential between 
interviewer and respondent. 
 
By contrast, Bourdieu was prepared to intervene to prevent the inclusion in the book 
of interviews where the relationship between interviewer and interviewee became too 
comfortable (1999: 616-7). In one specific example which he discusses in the final 
essay, an interview with a woman who interpreted her educational problems as a 
narrative of displaced identity was rejected because such self-narrativising ‘excludes 
de facto any investigation of the objective facts of [the interviewee’s] trajectory’. 
While purely self-referential interviews are certainly unhelpful, the obvious question 
is who determines in advance what the ‘objective facts’ of the interviewee’s situation 
are, and on what criteria? Bourdieu’s own cautionary comment (1999: 63-64) on the 
interview with Francois and Ali and its status as identity performance - that ‘it would 
be far more naïve to reject this possible truth’ (added emphasis) than to accept it at 
face value, because of its potential insights into a certain sort of self-despair, born of 
lack of symbolic resources - is relevant here.  
 
More broadly, we have to ask whether, in the preselection of interviewees, the 
conducting of specific interviews, the selection of completed  interviews for the book, 
and the interpretation of interviews within it, Bourdieu and his team ended up simply 
confirming the presumption of social suffering from which the whole research project 
started. This is an obvious line of attack and indeed one which Bourdieu himself 
acknowledges when he speaks of the project as ‘invoking’ from the subjects ‘as the 
research invites them to do “what is wrong” with their lives’ (1999: 615, added 
emphasis). More worrying than occasional steers in the interviews’ published text is 
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preselection during interviewee recruitment, since it cannot retrospectively be 
monitored. A response to this charge (if not a complete one) is to draw on the political 
justification for the book’s subject-matter (noted at the beginning of this article), 
arguing that it is a counter-weight to sociological and media narratives that give 
insufficient attention, for example, to the unemployed’s ‘omnipresent fear of hitting 
rock-bottom’ (1999: 371), or the profound isolation of many sick and elderly people 
(1999: 600), or the anger of the socially and economically disadvantaged when they 
feel misrepresented in their rare opportunities to be heard in the media (1999: 103-5).  
 
There remains, however, another problem in how Bourdieu understands social 
suffering. A striking absence from the book discussed more in the next section is any 
sense of the everyday pleasures of those interviewed, in social interaction or leisure 
activities and particularly in media and cultural consumption. Were these topics 
excluded in advance from the interview protocols, and if so why, given that Bourdieu 
was all too aware that ‘nothing is simpler, more “natural”, than imposing a 
problematic’ in interview research (1999: 619)?  Since media consumption is one 
obvious common topic to ‘break the ice’ in an interview situation, are we to assume 
that an effort was made to avoid any such discussions or instead to edit those that 
occurred out of the finished text?  
 
It is important to remember at this point just how much editing lies behind the final 
selection of voices presented in the book.8 In the book’s final essay ‘Understanding’, 
Bourdieu acknowledges the value of William Labov’s method for investigating 
speech patterns by using people from the same linguistic group to do the recording 
(1999: 611); are, he suggests, interviews with people about their living conditions 
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better done by those without formal sociological training (1999: 611), as in Paul 
Radin’s 1930s work?9 Indeed this was Bourdieu’s original plan: his small team of 
trained sociologists were to reply on a large army of untrained interviewers or 
mediators who would conduct the bulk of the interviews, but as he explains a 
significant proportion of those ‘lay’ interviewers’ work was excluded from the 
published research because of over-identifications between interviewer and 
interivewee, which ‘produced little more than sociolinguistic data, incapable of 
providing the means for their own interpretation’ (1999: 611-12). In the English 
edition, of 42 interviews (some of them joint interviews), 25 were conducted by 
Bourdieu and his core sociologist team10 or by long-term collaborators of Bourdieu 
(Champagne, Wacquant, Bourgois). What we cannot know, of course, is how that 
excluded ‘sociolinguistic data’ might have changed the book’s depiction of social 
suffering.  
 
The Weight of the World: Some Strategic Absences 
It is time to look at the broader methodological and theoretical judgements that stand 
behind the text of The Weight of the World. Paul Rabinow has depicted Bourdieu’s 
method as tragically contradictory, and therefore flawed: 
Against the grain of his own system, Bourdieu sympathises, does find the 
pervasive reproduction of social inequalities . . . both fascinating and intolerable, 
he does respect his subjects . . . However, he “knows” better and therefore must 
engage in the constant battle to overcome these sentiments, so as to become . . . 
indifferent. Hence, his (unrecognized) pathos.  (Rabinow, 1996: 13) 
Although ‘indifference’ in a sense derived from Epicurean philosophy is a term 
Bourdieu himself uses (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 115-117; cf Bourdieu, 1999: 
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614), Rabinow’s claim both overdramatises and oversimplifies Bourdieu’s position. 
While the issue of avoiding emotional identification is occasionally raised in The 
Weight of the World (for example 1999: 152, chapter by Loic Wacquant), in his 
preface Bourdieu talks of a balance between achieving objectivity and avoiding ‘the 
objectivising distance that reduces the individual to a specimen in a display case’; 
analysis of interview material ‘must adopt a perspective as close as possible to the 
individual’s own without identifying with the alter ego’ (1999: 2). ‘Participant 
objectivation’ (as Bourdieu calls this method)11 involves getting close enough to the 
agent’s point of view to reproduce it in all its taken-for-granted depth - as the point of 
view of a real agent speaking from a distinctive location in social space – but avoiding 
an emotional identification. While sharing Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological concern 
with the taken-for-granted, Bourdieu rejects completely Garfinkel’s (and indeed 
Goffman’s and Schutz’s) belief that close analysis of the interaction situation is 
sufficient unto itself; a fortiori emotions generated by the interaction must be 
excluded. Bourdieu is offering more than a knee-jerk insistence on ‘objective’ 
scientific rigour (a claim he mocks elsewhere in relation to supposedly neutral survey 
research); his point is that emotion generated by the interview situation is misplaced.  
As Bourdieu argued on many occasions, romanticising  the local encounter involves 
‘the interactionist error’ (1990b: 167; cf 2000: 146-147, 174) of ignoring that the 
space of social encounters is already distorted in advance by wider forces. 
 
The problem, then, is not Bourdieu’s striving for emotional distance (as Rabinow 
claims), but rather the type of theory Bourdieu brings to the interpretation of the 
interviews. As noted briefly in the last section, a fundamental weakness in the book’s 
theoretical universe, not just its methodological practice, is its downplaying, to the 
 21
point, almost, of silence, of media and popular culture’s role in interviewees’ lives;  
the contrast, for example, with Carl Nightingale’s work on inner city US black 
communities (1993), is striking. This drastic selectivity on the part of Bourdieu and 
his team is never explained or justified and applies even in the book’s substantial 
section on the US inner cities. The Weight of the World is simply blind to the 
possibility that media and cultural consumption (fashion, cars, clothes, leisure) might 
work as a common resource linking local experiences. Where media do figure, this is, 
as already noted, in the analysis of the disruptive effects of media representations on 
those who lack cultural capital (1999: 46-59, cf 104-105, 213), but this cannot be the 
whole story. This argument against Bourdieu is not based on a populist view of 
cultural consumption. For what is important in Carl Nightingale’s argument is 
precisely his insistence on the disarticulation between shared material aspirations 
sustained by media and cultural consumption and the actual and continuing inequality 
in resources and life chances from which poor inner city black populations in the US 
suffer. It is this, he argues, that is intolerable, and reinforces exclusion on a deeper 
level. Given Bourdieu’s interest in analysing ‘durable inequality’ (Tilly, 1999), he 
would surely have wanted to take such issues of alienation seriously; indeed they are 
mentioned in passing (Champagne, at 1999: 59, 110; Bourdieu and Champagne, at 
1999: 425-6). But by bracketing out the everyday landscape of media and cultural 
consumption that people inhabit, and its possible pleasures, as well as its frustrations, 
the book’s analysis of social suffering is significantly weakened. 
 
What can explain this strange absence? Bourdieu’s often-criticised distance from 
popular culture can hardly be sufficient, given the seriousness of Bourdieu’s attempt 
here to engage with the texture of everyday lives. More relevant is his explicit aim, 
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through the interviews, of allowing interviewees some distance from the oppressive 
burden, as he sees it, of the media’s ‘common sense’ view of the world (1999: 620). 
Yet, while it would certainly be a distortion to assume that media are the central focus 
of everyday experience,12 it is equally misleading to assume there is no substance to 
the mechanisms media and popular culture offer for coping with everyday ‘suffering’ 
(cf Walkerdine, 1999). Media and popular culture (television, film, music, magazines, 
sport) are surely more than a simple pain-killer without cognitive consequences. 
Bourdieu here falls foul of one of his own most powerful criticisms of mainstream 
sociology and anthropology: ignoring the consequences of the analyst’s preexisting, 
socially produced, distance from the interviewee (Bourdieu, 1977: 1-2). This 
difference, as Bourdieu himself makes clear, is not one of emotion, but of interest; the 
analyst’s distanced interest in the interviewees’ life is a privilege based in what 
Bourdieu elsewhere calls ‘that logical and political scandal, the monopolization of the 
universal’ (2000: 84); yet the consumption of media and popular culture cannot be 
understood without considering its role in the contestation (by no means necessarily 
successful, let alone universal) of such monopolization. No shared emotion, or indeed 
suppression of emotion, could change the reality of the sociologist interviewer’s 
privileged distance (hence Rabinow’s critique is misplaced). What would have been 
valuable, however, is more theoretical reflection on Bourdieu’s part concerning the 
consequences of his own distance from media and popular culture for his ability to 
depict convincingly contemporary experiences of social suffering.  
 
What of the wider aims of Bourdieu’s sociology in The Weight of the World? 
Bourdieu’s methodology – its particular focus and ambition – only makes sense in the 
light of his belief that sociology, and preeminently sociology, can illuminate the 
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‘essential principle of what is lived and seen on the ground’ (1999: 123). But what 
‘ground’ are we discussing? Given that (as we have seen) Bourdieu is prepared to use 
his sociological judgement to override an individual voice, we need to look closely at 
the criteria that drive the book’s interpretative decisions. In discussing a provincial 
wine dealer, close to retirement after a working life of declining success, Patrick 
Champagne comments:  
If there was nothing to surprise me in these aggressive observations, which I had 
heard many times over without really understanding then, I was still astonished at 
just how sociologically coherent those observations are once they are connected to 
the social position of the person making them (a move not made in ordinary 
conversation or done only to counter-attack). (in Bourdieu, 1999: 392-93, added 
emphasis) 
Or, as Bourdieu himself puts it (1999: 391), when interpreting a farmer’s talk about 
his son’s failure to take on the family farm as a masked statement that the son had 
killed the father, ‘it was only after having constructed the explanatory model – 
simultaneously unique and generic’ that such an interpretation became possible. 
These admissions of difficulty, while refreshingly honest, raise a problem. It is not 
obvious how a ‘model’ (explaining what someone in this farmer’s structural position 
might mean to say about his son) can reveal what this particular farmer actually meant 
to say on that particular occasion. This gap, Bourdieu insists, cannot be filled with 
psychoanalysis (1999: 513, 620-621), but, if so, how is it to be filled?  Bourdieu 
appears to rely on a theory of how to understand what is unsaid, an implicit theory of 
repression (1999: 615), that surely needs more discussion (cf Billig, 1997). The theory 
of ‘habitus’ – as the general principle that determines the range of practices available 
to an individual – hardly seems sufficient to explain the dynamics of individual 
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narratives, and their specific repressions and absences. There remains, then, at the end 
of the book, a gap between the ‘partial and temporary truths’ of the interview method 
(1999: 629) and Bourdieu’s wider sociological framework.  
 
Perhaps such a gap is in principle insoluble. Perhaps the resulting uncertainty is 
inherent in all serious fieldwork, as George Marcus (1999) has recently argued, 
although it is unclear whether Bourdieu would have endorsed Marcus’ 
epistemological specticism. I suspect that Bourdieu was well aware of the gap 
between the ‘evidence’ of the book’s interviews and his bigger social theory, and 
wanted to confront it. It is a mistake to see this, crudely, as a failing deriving from the 
tension between habitus and lived situation throughout social theory (Martuccelli, 
1999: 141), because it is precisely such tensions which the book’s final essay appears 
deliberately to heighten. If so, the book’s uncertainties, unresolved tensions and 
strategic absences must be accepted for what they are, inviting one final question: 
notwithstanding them, does The Weight of the World yield an enriched understanding 
of the conditions under which contemporary individuals act and speak?  
 
Conclusion 
This article has answered that question by arguing that The Weight of the World  is 
indeed successful in such terms. It is the book’s very particular combination of 
empirical engagement, methodological reflexivity and theoretical commitment 
(commitment, that is, to maintaining some notion of social structure operating within 
the details of local experience) that allows us to explore the tensions on which this 
article has focussed. In this way, the books takes us, I would suggest, further than 
either the general theory of Giddens and Luhmann or the empirical investigations of 
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‘de-socialisation’ within Touraine’s school. At the same time, we cannot be satisfied 
with the flaws in Bourdieu’s approach that this article has identified. Since my most 
fundamental criticism of The Weight of the World has been its inattention to media 
and popular culture’s role in everyday experience, I want to conclude by arguing, 
briefly, for the value of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (if applied in a more open 
fashion) in addressing precisely that aspect of contemporary cultures.13  
 
We live, arguably, in an age where two things are happening simultaneously: both the 
dispersal of some forms of social and cultural authority and the intense concentration 
of forces of media and cultural production through which certain other social rhetorics 
can be channelled. If so, there is value in examining the categorising power (in 
Durkheim’s sense) of media institutions in everyday life, for example the intensely 
negotiated categories such as ‘reality’, ‘liveness’, ‘celebrity’ and so on. These 
categories are interesting not because they are fashionable, but because of their 
combined role as both social and cognitive distinctions, precisely the dual usage 
which Bourdieu saw as distinctive of symbolic systems (Swartz, 1997: 87-88) and as 
so important to the interpretation of individual narratives.  
 
It would have been interesting, for example, if Bourdieu’s interviewees had been 
asked to reflect on their view of today’s mediated public spaces (the talk show, for 
example) as places from which to represent themselves; the marking of such spaces 
by class differentials is so important that they are, arguably, an ideal site for symbolic 
analysis in the spirit of Bourdieu (Grindstaff, 2002; Couldry, 2003a, chapter 7). We 
could move from the analysis of certain key social classifications in media and 
popular culture to reexamine how ‘habitus’, the foundational term in Bourdieu’s work 
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that links structure and agency, should be rethought for an age when virtually every 
living-space has its own electronic window onto the world?14 We could broaden our 
analysis to rethink the sociological implications of the constraints under which in 
mediated societies individual narratives of the social world get produced, exactly the 
type of issue that was characteristic of Bourdieu’s sociology as a whole; from there, 
we could gain a sense of how this constructed ‘world’ of media representations is 
involved in subtly constraining the imagined space of action of specific individuals. 
 
Paradoxically, given Bourdieu’s stated hostility to ‘cultural studies’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1999), the result of developing Bourdieu’s concerns with habitus  would 
be something akin to the aim set by Elspeth Probyn for cultural studies itself: the aim 
of ‘thinking the social through’ the self (1993: 3, added emphasis). There is more at 
stake here, in other words, than the continuation of one sociologist’s legacy. The issue 
is how best to develop, in an inter-disciplinary spirit, the theoretical basis for critical 
commentary on both the commonalities and the divisions of contemporary cultures. 
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1
 I discuss this at greater length in Couldry (2000: chapter 3).  
2
 Quoted, Bourdieu (1999: 93). 
3
 See Bourdieu (2002).  
4
 This analysis is picked up also at various points in the Pascalian Meditations  
(2000).  
5
 See respectively Elliott, 1996 and Bauman, 1992. 
6
 See Young (1999: chapter 3) for valuable discussion.  
7
 He is surely right, although hardly pathbreaking, to draw back from treating the 
interviews as ‘truths’ about those who speak (1999: 63, 240, 536). This has been a 
consistent theme for example of anthropology and feminist sociology for two decades 
or so (see for example Scott, 1992; Gray, 1997). 
8
 Note that not all the interviews published in the original French edition were 
included in the English translation. 
9
 Discussed in Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 23). 
10
 Christin, Delaut, Pialoux, Sayad (see 1999: 611). 
11
 This translation, previously adopted in other Bourdieu translations, seems, perhaps 
even because of its initial awkwardness,  preferable to ‘participant objectification’ 
introduced by the recent translators of The Weight of the World.  
12
 I have argued against the prevalence of this assumption in media studies (Couldry, 
2003a). 
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13
 Clearly to develop this point fully would require at least one article by itself. For 
part of such an argument, see Couldry (2003b). 
14
 For the continued relevance of Bourdieu’s notion of embodied ‘habitus’, compared 
with Foucault’s discourse-based analysis, see McNay (1999). 
